Winter Storm Uri: What Happened and What Changed

What Happened in February 2021

Winter Storm Uri hit Texas on February 13, 2021, bringing record-breaking cold across the entire state. Temperatures that are common in northern states were catastrophic for Texas infrastructure that had never been built to handle them. Dallas saw lows of -2 degrees Fahrenheit. Houston dropped to 13 degrees. Even the Rio Grande Valley, which rarely sees freezing weather, hit the teens.

The cold was not the only problem. It lasted for days. Unlike a typical Texas cold snap that breaks after 24-48 hours, Uri kept temperatures below freezing for more than 100 consecutive hours across much of the state.

How the Grid Failed

The Texas power grid failed because supply collapsed while demand surged to historic levels.

Demand skyrocketed. With temperatures 30-40 degrees below normal, Texans cranked up electric heaters, heat pumps, and furnaces. ERCOT saw winter demand far exceed anything in their planning models.

Supply collapsed. Power plants across every fuel type went offline:

• Natural gas generators lost fuel supply as gas wells, gathering lines, and processing plants froze. Natural gas provides the largest share of Texas generation, so this was the biggest single factor.
• Wind turbines iced up and stopped producing. Wind generation dropped significantly, though wind was already expected to produce less in winter.
• Coal plants suffered from frozen coal piles and equipment failures.
• Nuclear plants had cold-weather-related trips and derates.

At the worst point, roughly 52,000 megawatts of generation capacity was offline — nearly half of the grid’s total capacity.

The grid nearly collapsed completely. In the early morning hours of February 15, ERCOT came within minutes of a total, uncontrolled blackout. Grid frequency dropped dangerously low, and operators ordered massive load shedding (controlled blackouts) to prevent a cascading failure that could have taken weeks to recover from.

The Human Cost

The consequences were devastating. More than 4.5 million homes and businesses lost power, many for three to four days. With no electricity and plummeting temperatures, pipes burst in millions of homes. Water treatment plants lost power, leading to boil-water notices across the state. Over 200 people died from hypothermia, carbon monoxide poisoning, and other storm-related causes.

The financial toll was staggering. Property damage from burst pipes alone ran into the tens of billions of dollars. Wholesale electricity prices hit the $9,000 per megawatt-hour cap for days, creating massive bills for REPs on variable wholesale contracts and for consumers on indexed retail plans.

What Changed After Uri

The Texas Legislature, PUCT, and ERCOT implemented sweeping reforms:

Weatherization Requirements (Senate Bill 3)

Passed in June 2021, SB 3 requires power generators, transmission operators, and natural gas facilities to winterize their equipment to withstand extreme cold. ERCOT and the Railroad Commission of Texas now inspect facilities before each winter season and can impose penalties for non-compliance.

Market Reforms

The PUCT redesigned parts of the wholesale market to better incentivize reliable generation. Key changes include lowering the system-wide offer cap from $9,000 to $5,000 per megawatt-hour and creating new mechanisms to reward generators that can deliver power when the grid needs it most.

Texas Energy Fund

In 2023, Texas voters approved the Texas Energy Fund, a $5 billion initiative to finance the construction of new natural gas power plants. The goal is to add 10,000+ megawatts of new dispatchable generation that can run regardless of weather conditions.

ERCOT Governance

The ERCOT board was restructured. Independent market participants no longer elect board members. Instead, the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of the House appoint all board members, giving the state direct control over grid management decisions.

Improved Coordination with Gas Supply

New rules require natural gas facilities that supply power plants to be designated as critical infrastructure. This means they get priority for electricity during emergencies, reducing the risk of the fuel-supply-to-power-plant feedback loop that crippled the grid during Uri.

Where Things Stand Now

Texas has invested billions of dollars in grid improvements since 2021. New generation capacity has come online, weatherization standards are enforced, and ERCOT has more tools to manage extreme weather events. The grid successfully handled the December 2022 winter storm (Elliott) and subsequent cold snaps with no widespread outages.

However, challenges remain. Texas is adding population and electric load faster than new generation is being built. The transition to renewable energy brings benefits but also requires backup generation for periods when wind and solar are not producing. And climate change is making extreme weather events — both summer heat and winter cold — more frequent.

The Bottom Line

Winter Storm Uri was the worst infrastructure failure in modern Texas history. The reforms that followed have meaningfully strengthened the grid, but no system is completely immune to extreme events. Understanding what happened and what has changed helps you prepare for future storms and make informed decisions about your electricity plan.